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Campaigning for president last year, Pat Buchanan cited the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute)' as a key
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1. ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.183/9 (1998) [hereinafter ICC STATUTE], reprinted in THE STATUTE OF THE
battleground in "the millennial struggle... of patriots of every nation
against a world government where all nations yield up their sovereignty
and fade away."'  Others have sounded similar warnings about
infringements on sovereignty.3  Nor are these concerns limited to the
ICC Statute's American critics. China, for example, has objected that
the International Criminal Court (ICC) will "directly infringe [] on the
judicial sovereignty of States."4
President Clinton authorized the United States signing of the ICC
Statute on December 31, 2000, while also stating that it should not be
considered for ratification at this time because of "significant flaws."5
This action, along with strong opposition to the ICC Statute among the
Republican leadership on Capitol Hill,6 assures that discussion of the
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 39-100 (M. Cherif
Bassiouni ed., 1998) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY], reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999
(1998), available at http://www.un.org/icc/.
2. Patrick J. Buchanan, The Millennium Conflict: America First or World
Government, Speech Delivered to Boston World Affairs Council 9 (Jan. 6, 2000) (on file
with author).
3. See e.g., Senator Jesse Helms, "Toward a Compassionate Foreign Policy,"
Address Before the American Enterprise Institute 9 (Jan. 11, 2001), available at
http://www.aei.org/past-event/conf010l I l.htm. ("This brazen assault on the sovereignty
of the American people is without precedent in the annals of international treaty law.");
Hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on International Operations of the Committee
on Foreign Relations, Is a U.N. International Criminal Court in the U.S. National
Interest?, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (July 23, 1998) (Statement of Sen. John Ashcroft)
("By ceding the authority to define and punish crimes, many nations took an irrevocable
step to the loss of national sovereignty and the reality of global government."); id. at 3
(Statement of Senator Rod Grams) ("[W]e must affirm that the United States will not
cede its sovereignty to an institution which claims to have the power to override the U.S.
legal system and to pass judgment on our foreign policy actions."); id. at 69 (Statement
of Lee A. Casey) (warning that creation of the Court "represents a profound surrender of
American sovereignty - the right of self-government"); Gary T. Dempsey, Reasonable
Doubt: The Case Against the Proposed International Criminal Court, 311 CATO INST.
POL'Y ANALYSIS I (July 16, 1998) ("[T]he Court threatens to diminish America's
sovereignty ....").
4. Views and Comments by Governments, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: THE MAKING OF THE STATUTE; ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 573, 582 (Roy
S. Lee ed., 1999) (summary of views expressed by Chinese government on Oct. 21,
1998) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT].
5. See Thomas E. Ricks, U.S. Signs Treaty on War Crimes Tribunal; Pentagon,
Republicans Object to Clinton Move, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2001, at Al. President
Clinton noted his "concerns about significant flaws in the treaty," but said he signed it in
order to demonstrate U.S. "support for international accountability" and to permit the
U.S. to continue working to improve the treaty. Id. By the terms of the ICC Statute, it
was open for signature without ratification only until December 31, 2000. See ICC
STATUTE, supra note 1, art. 125, para. 1.
6. For example, Senator Jesse Helms denounced the signature for being "as
outrageous as it is inexplicable," and said that reversing the decision would be "one of
my highest priorities in the new Congress." Helms on Clinton ICC Signature: "This
Decision Will Not Stand" (Helms press release, on file with author) (December 31,
2000). In the 106th Congress, senior Republicans in both houses of Congress sponsored
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proposed ICC's effect on sovereignty will continue. Fears of losing
sovereignty have a long history in shaping U.S. responses to
international agreements, especially those relating to human rights.7 It is
possible, if not likely, that sovereignty concerns will prevent the U.S.
ratification of the ICC Statute for a long time to come.
"Sovereignty" is not an easily defined term.8 For purposes of this
essay, "sovereignty" is used in the broad sense of individual States'
being at liberty to act without interference from a higher power.9 The
issue, therefore, is the extent to which the ICC Statute prospectively
takes from individual States the ability to act as they wish in any given
circumstance.
The two volumes under review provide useful insight into the
evolution of the ICC Statute and the negotiating dynamics that shaped its
final form, including the ways sovereignty concerns were addressed. At
its core, the ICC Statute provides for the creation of an international
institution that will have the power to assess individual criminal
accountability, a function that has traditionally, though not exclusively,
been an exercise of the sovereign power of individual States.' °
the American Servicemembers Protection Act, S. 2726 and H.R. 4654, both of which
were introduced on June 14, 2000. The legislation would prohibit U.S. cooperation with
the ICC as long as the U.S. is not a party to the Statute. See American Servicemembers,
Protection Act, § 4. It also would prohibit U.S. military assistance to any nation that is a
party to the Statute, other than NATO countries and specified major non-NATO allies.
See id. § 7.
7. See, e.g., LAWRENCE J. LEBLANC, THE UNITED STATES AND THE GENOCIDE
CONVENTION 130-32 (1991); Samantha Power, The United States and Genocide Law: A
History of Ambivalence, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 165, 169-70 (Sarah B. Sewall &
Carl Kaysen eds., 2000); William R. Sprance, The World Trade Organization and the
United States' Sovereignty: The Political and Procedural Realities of the System, 13 AM.
U. INT'L L. REV. 1225, 1227-28 (1998) (describing the public debate about the effect that
the World Trade Organization would have on U.S. sovereignty).
8. See, e.g., MICHAEL ROSS FOWLER & JULIE MARIE BUNCK, LAW, POWER, AND
THE SOVEREIGN STATE: THE EVOLUTION AND APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF
SOVEREIGNTY 6 (1995) "[T]he meaning of sovereignty varies according to the issue that
is being addressed or the question that is being asked."); STEPHEN D. KRASNER,
SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 3 (1999) (describing "muddle[d]" uses of the
term).
9. See Jack Donnelly, State Sovereignty and International Intervention: The Case
of Human Rights, in BEYOND WESTPHALIA? STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL
INTERVENTION 115, 116 (Gene M. Lyons & Michael Mastanduno eds., 1995).
10. See I VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 126 (1995); see also
GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES
TRIBUNALS 5 (2000) (asserting that "[i]nternational war crimes tribunals are a recurring
Nevertheless, the ICC Statutory scheme presupposes a system of
sovereign States. In a number of crucial respects, the ICC Statute, which
after all was the result of negotiations among sovereign States, defers to
concerns of sovereignty. The way in which those concerns were
resolved in the negotiations may not be acceptable to the American
polity vis-A-vis the United States' sovereignty; that is a different issue.
What is clear is that the success or failure of the ICC will ultimately
depend upon decisions yet to be made by States acting in their sovereign
capacities.
Of particular importance in considering the issue of sovereignty are:
1) the principle of complementarity, 2) the preconditions to the exercise
of the ICC's jurisdiction, 3) the treatment of national security
information, and 4) the relationship of the Prosecutor's office to national
judicial systems when conducting investigations. These four areas
define the ICC's relationship to individual States." In each of these
areas, the ICC Statute defers in significant ways to State sovereignty
concerns. Before dealing with those specific areas, this essay briefly
reviews the process that culminated with adoption of the ICC Statute.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (ICC)
Professor Cherif Bassiouni traces the origins of efforts to create a
permanent international criminal tribunal, starting from the efforts in
1919 to the end of World War 1.2 These efforts received a boost after
World War II with the international military tribunals in Nuremberg and
Tokyo. 3 And reflecting some sense of the sentiment in support of a
permanent international court that existed after World War II, the United
Nations Genocide Convention explicitly contemplated that the crime of
genocide could be tried before an international tribunal. 4  A special
modem phenomenon").
11. See ICC STATUTE, supra note 1. One way in which the ICC STATUTE will
require States to yield sovereignty in a normative sense is through the subject matter
jurisdiction of the ICC, which codifies individual criminal responsibility for actions that
at one time were considered matters of state responsibility. See THEODOR MERON, WAR
CRIMES LAW COMES OF AGE 303, 305-09 (1998). Being for the most part derivative of
existing international law, this aspect of the ICC STATUTE by itself does not appreciably
restrict sovereignty more than already resulted from widely ratified precursors such as:
the Genocide Convention, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and the Convention Against
Torture - to all of which the United States is a party. See U.N. CONVENTION ON THE
PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF GENOCIDE art. 6, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1948).
12. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Historical Survey: 1919-1998, in DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1, 3-15. For a discussion of the 19h century roots of 2 0h
century war crimes tribunals, see BASS, supra note 10, at 37-57.
13. See Bassiouni, supra note 12, at 9.
14. U.N. CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF GENOCIDE, supra
note 11.
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committee of the United Nations General Assembly produced drafts of a
statute for a permanent court in 1951 and 1953." But the various efforts
to promote such a Court in the years after the war were stillborn, in no
small part due to skepticism and sovereignty concerns on the part of
major powers."
The idea reemerged contemporaneously with the end of the Cold War
in 1989 when Trinidad and Tobago urged the United Nations General
Assembly to investigate the creation of an international tribunal to deal
with drug trafficking.'7 This initiative ultimately resulted in a Draft
Statute for an International Criminal Court (ILC Draft Statute), which
the International Law Commission (ILC) presented to the General
Assembly in 1994."' As the fall of the Berlin Wall made it politically
feasible for the project to proceed, violence in the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda, which resulted in the creation of the first international
criminal tribunals since Nuremberg and Tokyo,' 9 added a sense of
urgency .20
The ILC Draft Statute was revised between 1996 and 1998 by a
Preparatory Committee (PrepCom), which met periodically in New York
and was open to all member States of the United Nations. 2' The
PrepCom completed its work in April 1998 by producing a draft statute
(PrepCom Draft Statute), to be considered for adoption by a five-week
diplomatic conference scheduled for that June in Rome. A notable
feature of the PrepCom's Draft Statute was the number of issues that
15. See Bassiouni, supra note 12, at 13-14. The relevant UN documents from this
period are reprinted in 2 BENJAMIN FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
STEP TOWARD WORLD PEACE 337-459 (1980).
16. See Bassiouni, supra note 12, at 12-13.
17. See id. at 16-17.
18. See id. at 17; INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION: DRAFT STATUTE FOR AN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (1994), reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 1, at 657-73 [hereinafter ILC DRAFT STATUTE].
19. See ARYEH NEIER, WAR CRIMES: BRUTALITY, GENOCIDE, TERROR, AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 111-33 (1998) (discussing the background of the Tribunals'
creation).
20. See Bassiouni, supra note 12, at 18-19 ("The events in Yugoslavia and
Rwanda shocked the world out of its complacency and the idea of prosecuting those who
committed international crimes acquired a broad based support in world public opinion
and many governments."). Gary Bass, among others, has underscored the deeply
ambiguous nature of the legal response to Yugoslavia and Rwanda: "Law became a
euphemism for inaction." BASS, supra note 10, at 215.
21. See Bassiouni, supra note 12, at 20-24. Various reports and other work
product of the Preparatory Committee are reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 1, at 115-616.
were left unresolved. For every unresolved issue, various options were
presented in bracketed text, some 1300 words in 166 proposed articles.22
The goal of the diplomatic conference was to remove the brackets and
obtain agreement on a final Statute; a daunting challenge given the
technical complexity of the task, the participation of many diplomats
who were not previously involved in the process and, not least, the
difficult political issues inherent in the creation of a new international
institution. 23 Not surprisingly, the issues that touched most directly on
sovereignty concerns, including State consent to court proceedings and
the treatment of national security information, were among the last to be
resolved.24
The diplomatic conference concluded with adoption of the Rome
Statute of the ICC on July 17, 1998.25 By its terms, the Statute will enter
into force once 60 nations have ratified it.26 When the period for nations
to sign the Statute ended on December 31, 2000,27 139 nations, including
the U.S., had signed. Twenty-nine nations have ratified the Statute, with
many more actively pursuing their domestic ratification procedures. The
Statute's entry into force will result in the creation of a permanent
criminal court with subject matter jurisdiction over genocide, crimes
against humanity, and serious war crimes. 28 The Court will also have
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, but jurisdiction will be
exercised only if the Statute is amended to define that crime and to
establish the conditions for exercising jurisdiction.29
II. COMPLEMENTARITY
A foundational issue is the relationship of the ICC's jurisdiction to
22. See id. at 26.
23. See id. at 26-27, 27 n.136.
24. See infra Parts III and IV.
25. See Bassiouni, supra note 12, at 32. Lawrence Weschler, a staff writer for The
New Yorker, has produced a highly readable account of the Rome Conference, focused
especially on the issue of state consent. Lawrence Weschler, Exceptional Cases in
Rome: The United States and the Struggle for an ICC, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 7, at 85-111.
26. See ICC STATUTE, supra note 1, art. 126, para. 1.
27. Id. art. 125, para. 1. Although the Statute is no longer open for signature, any
State can accede to the Statute by depositing the appropriate instrument with the
Secretary General of the United Nations. Id. art. 125, para. 3.
28. Id. arts. 5-8.
29. See ICC STATUTE, supra note I, art. 5, paras. l(d), 2. Amendment of the
Statute to define aggression will not be easily accomplished, as it requires agreement of
two-thirds of the parties to the Statute. Id. art. 121, para. 3. Even then, the amendment
would not apply to the nationals or on the territory of those States Parties that do not
ratify or otherwise accept the amendment. Id. art. 121, para. 5. The status of signatures
and ratifications, as maintained by the United Nations is available at http://www.un.org/
law/icc/statute/status.htm.
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that of national judicial systems. In establishing the ad hoc tribunals for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), the Security
Council accorded them "primacy."30  Under this arrangement, the
tribunal enjoys priority if a national system and a tribunal both seek to
exercise jurisdiction over a case.3' One consequence of the power of
primacy is to minimize the extent to which competition between national
and international mechanisms of justice can impede the work of the
tribunals.32 A second consequence is that the States' sovereign power to
prosecute relevant offenses can be superceded by the international
tribunal.
As a legal matter, primacy for the ad hoc tribunals stemmed from the
Security Council's plenary power under Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter, to protect international peace and security.33 Even
though the ICTY Statute explicitly gave the ICTY primacy over national
courts, key States sought to limit this infringement on a basic element of
sovereignty. The U.S., France, the United Kingdom, and Russia offered
interpretive statements suggesting that the power of primacy should be
exercised only to preempt national proceedings that are not impartial,
that are intended to shield the accused from criminal responsibility, or
that are not diligently prosecuted 4 This interpretation of "primacy" was
not adopted in the ICTY's Rules of Procedure and Evidence," but it is
very similar to complementarity as ultimately embodied in the ICC
Statute.
The reasoning that justified primacy for the ad hoc tribunals would
also apply to the ICC. Jurisdictional competition would be minimized if
the ICC could assert priority over national systems. But in the ICC
30. STATUTE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA art. 9, para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) (amended 1998), reprinted in
32 I.L.M. 1192 (1993), available at http://un.org/icty/basic/statut/statute.htm; STATUTE
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA art. 8, para. 2, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598 (1994), available at http://www.ictr.org/.
31. See id.
32. Although the power of primacy gives the upper hand to the international
tribunal, it does not altogether forestall disputes between the national and international
systems. See MADELINE H. MORRIS, JUSTICE IN THE WAKE OF GENOCIDE, IN WAR
CRIMES: THE LEGACY OF NUREMBERG 218-26 (Belinda Cooper ed., 1999) (describing
conflicts between the international tribunal for Rwanda and the Rwandan government).
33. U.N. CHARTER ch. VII; see MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 10, at 125.
34. See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 10, at 127 n.381.
35. Id. at 127 n.381, 130 n.384; INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE R. 9, U.N. Doc.
IT/32/REV.18 (1994) (amended 2000).
negotiations, the issue was presented more directly as a matter of
principle than it had been in the Security Council, which had been
dealing with the particular situations of the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, where viable national alternatives were not immediately
available. As a matter of principle, the issue directly implicated
sovereignty concerns, and a number of States were intent on ensuring
that primary responsibility for dealing with the crimes in the ICC's
jurisdiction remained with national systems. 6 There was not much
possibility that the ICC negotiations would result in an international
court with primacy over national courts.
Indeed, "complementarity" - the principle that the ICC would
complement rather than supersede national systems - was a key feature
of the International Law Commission's 1994 draft,37 and over the course
of negotiations leading up to the final ICC Statute, the complementarity
regime was progressively strengthened. Under the principle of
complementarity, cases being handled by a national system are not
"admissible" before the ICC 8
The 1994 ILC Draft Statute emphasized in its preamble that the ICC
was "intended to be complementary to national criminal justice systems
in cases where such trial procedures may not be available or may be
ineffective."3 9 The ILC Draft Statute also provided that a case would not
be admissible in the ICC if a State had investigated and made an
"apparently well-founded" decision not to prosecute, or if a State was in
the process of investigating and there was "no reason for the Court to
take any further action for the time being."4°
The prospect, plain in the ILC Draft Statute, that the ICC could take
on cases where a national system was available but "ineffective," proved
to be a source of dispute in subsequent negotiations, not the least
because of sovereignty concerns.4' The negotiators ultimately settled on
36. See John T. Holmes, The Principle of Complementarity, in INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 4, at 41. "A fundamental question facing the drafters of
the statute of the International Criminal Court (the Court) was the role the institution
would play in relation to national courts. The general view was that the International
Criminal Court should complement national jurisdiction...; hence the word
complementarity was used to describe the relationship between these two institutions."
Id.
37. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court I 29, in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note I, at 620 ("The principle of
complementarity was described as an essential element in the establishment of an
international criminal court" by many delegations.).
38. See ICC STATUTE, supra note 1, art. 17.
39. See ILC DRAFr STATUTE (preamble), reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 1, at 657.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Holmes, supra note 36, at 47-48; Report of the Preparatory
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court 161, in
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the concept of "unwillingness."42 Where a State is investigating or
prosecuting a case, that case is inadmissible before the international
court "unless the State is unwilling.. .genuinely to carry out the
investigation or prosecution., 43 Even if a State investigates and decides
not to prosecute, the case is inadmissible "unless the decision resulted
from the unwillingness.., of the State genuinely to prosecute. ' "4 In
contrast to the 1994 ILC Draft Statute, the final version of the Statute
more clearly adopts a presumption in favor of national legal
proceedings. It also raises the standard for overcoming that presumption
by focusing on the genuine willingness to investigate or prosecute, rather
than the vaguer and more elastic standard of effectiveness used in the
1994 ILC Draft Statue.
Although these changes made the complementarity regime more
protective of state sovereignty, they did not totally assuage sovereignty
concerns. This lead to the inclusion of "criteria," which the ICC will use
to determine questions of unwillingness.4 '  The ICC is directed to
consider whether "the purpose" of the national proceedings is to "shield
[]the person concerned from criminal responsibility;" whether delay in
the process is "unjustified," such that it is "inconsistent with an intent to
bring the person concerned to justice;" or whether there is an absence of
either independence or impartiality in the proceedings and their conduct
is "inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.' '
These criteria give more substance to the concept of "unwillingness,"
and point in the direction of requiring an active effort by the State to
prevent accountability before national proceedings can be disregarded.
This approach, though protective of sovereignty, does intrude on
sovereignty to some degree because it includes exceptions and allows
the Court, rather than the State, to be the judge of admissibility. Going
into the Rome Conference, the PrepCom Draft Statute included an
alternative formulation under which the mere existence of a State
investigation or prosecution would be determinative of the
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 410 (noting the view that "the determination of
whether such a [national] system was 'ineffective' was too subjective" and by placing
"the Court in the position of passing judgment on the penal system of a State ... would
impinge on the sovereignty of national legal systems.").
42. ICC STATUTE, supra note 1, art. 17, para. 1(a).
43. Id.
44. Id. art. 17, para. 1(b).
45. See Holmes, supra note 36, at 50-51.
46. ICC STATUTE, supra note 1, art. 17, para. 2 (a)-(c).
complementarity issue. Under this proposal, the ICC would have been
deprived of the ability to act without regard to whether the proceedings
were bona fide. Thus, anyone who controlled, or whose allies
controlled, levers of State power would have been able to use
sovereignty as a shield against ICC proceedings. During the
negotiations in Rome, two delegations insisted on this approach,48 but
the consensus supporting the approach of the final ICC Statute was so
strong that this rather extreme alternative never received serious
consideration. That consensus reflected sensitivity to protecting
sovereignty, but a willingness by States to admit limitations.
As the substance of the ultimate complementarity regime became clear
during the course of negotiations leading up to the Rome Conference,
the U.S. proposed a procedure for "preliminary rulings" on
admissibility. ' 9 The proposal required the Prosecutor to notify States as
she began to look into a situation. If a State asserted that it would
investigate, the Prosecutor would be required to defer to that State,
unless she could convince the ICC of the State's unwillingness
genuinely to carry out that investigation." If the substance of the
complementarity regime is thought of as being protective of State
sovereignty, this proposal intended to provide an additional procedural
mechanism to further that protection.5'
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and those States that
favored a stronger ICC criticized the U.S. proposal.52 They argued that
providing another layer of protection for state sovereignty, through the
proposed procedure, would hamper the ICC's effectiveness by giving
States acting in bad faith the opportunity to delay ICC action, if not
thwart it altogether. By the same token, the U.S. offered the proposal,
47. See Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, (Draft Statute of the International Criminal Court and
Draft Final Act art. 15) in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 136-37; see also
Holmes, supra note 36, at 43-44.
48. See Holmes, supra note 36, at 52-53.
49. Id. at 68-69. This proposal, with modifications, became Article 18 of the ICC
STATUTE. ICC STATUTE, supra note 1, art. 18, para. 2.
50. See ICC STATUTE, supra note 1, art. 18, para. 2.
51. See David J. Scheffer, The United States and the International Criminal Court,
93 AM. J. INT'L L. 12, 13 (1999) (characterizing the U.S. proposal as an "effort to
broaden the complementarity regime").
52. See, e.g., Justice in the Balance: Recommendations for an Independent and
Effective International Criminal Court 78 (Human Rights Watch) (1998) ("Provisions
ensuring the rigorous protection of the principle of complementarity are already
incorporated into the statute."); The International Criminal Court: Making the Right
Choices, Part V." Recommendations to the Diplomatic Conference 38 (Amnesty
International) (1998) ("There seems to be little in the lengthy, complicated and unfair
proceedings required [by the proposal] which would help make the Court an effective
complement to national jurisdictions."); see also Holmes, supra note 36, at 70-71.
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and other States supported it, precisely because it added protection for
sovereignty, making it easier for them to accept the substance of the
complementarity regime."
The U.S. proposal for preliminary challenges to admissibility
ultimately became Article 18 of the ICC Statute."' Although changes
were made in the course of the Rome Conference to address the concern
that bad faith use of the procedure could impede the ICC's effectiveness,
the essence of the original proposal remains: the Prosecutor is required
to notify States when she begins an investigation and must defer to
national investigations or prosecutions at a State's request, unless she
successfully applies to the ICC for authorization to proceed.5 Thus,
Article 18 represents substantial additional protection for State
sovereignty over what would exist in its absence, protection provided at
the possible expense of the ICC's ultimate effectiveness 6
The inclusion of complementarity as a "cornerstone"57 of the ICC and
its substantive and procedural details reflect strong respect for state
sovereignty interests. Although the final result is accurately described as
a "delicate balance,"58 it is a balance that takes significant account of the
concerns of those States most focused on protecting national
sovereignty. As with other aspects of the ICC Statute, the
complementarity provisions reflect a willingness of nations to agree to
limitations in principle on state sovereignty, within the context of a
structure that recognizes and presupposes the primacy of sovereign
States.
III. PRECONDITIONS TO THE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION
The most contentious issue in the negotiations, which was only
resolved in the final hours of the Conference, was the extent to which -
before proceeding in a particular case - the ICC would have to obtain
consent of States that might have an interest in that case.59 The ILC
53. See Holmes, supra note 36, at 71.
54. ICC STATUTE, supra note 1, art. 18.
55. See id.
56. Id.
57. See Holmes, supra note 36, at 73.
58. See id. at 74.
59. See Philippe Kirsch & John T. Holmes, The Rome Conference on an
International Criminal Court: The Negotiating Process, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 2, 4 (1999)
(noting that on the issue of preconditions "the differences proved irreconcilable and
consensus eventually broke down, leading to a vote at the end of the conference"); Roy
Draft Statute provided that the ICC would be able to exercise
jurisdiction over a genocide "complaint" ' initiated by any State that is a
party to both the ICC Statute and to the United Nations Genocide
Convention, without the requirement of obtaining consent from any
other State, such as the State on whose territory the alleged genocide
occurred or whose nationals perpetrated the alleged genocide.6' The ILC
considered the ICC's jurisdiction over those genocide complaints to be
"inherent." 62 In other cases initiated by State complaint, the ICC would
be able to exercise jurisdiction only if that jurisdiction was accepted by
as many as three different States: the State that had custody of the
suspect, the State on the territory of which the conduct occurred, and any
State that requested surrender of the suspect from the custodial State.
63
Furthermore, the ILC Draft Statue contemplated that States could
become parties to the ICC Statute without accepting the ICC's
jurisdiction. 64 Acceptance of the ICC's jurisdiction would not be
"automatic," but rather would require that States take the additional step
of "opting in," which could be done either generally or in individual
cases. 65 States would retain the right to determine, on a case-by-case
basis, whether to permit the ICC to exercise jurisdiction in any case
where their acceptance was required. This approach, allowing States to
have a veto over particular cases and permitting States to reserve the
decision whether to accept the ICC's jurisdiction until presented with a
particular case, was strongly protective of sovereignty.
By the time the PrepCom completed its draft statute, the range of
possible schemes for the ICC's exercise of jurisdiction had expanded.
On one end of the range - that most protective of State sovereignty - the
ILC approach was supplemented by proposals to add more States whose
S. Lee, The Rome Conference and Its Contribution to International Law, in
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 4, at 1, 25-26.
60. See ILC DRAFT STATUTE art. 25, para. 1, reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 1, at 663. The ILC's concept that States who are parties would file
"complaints," ultimately was dropped in favor of providing that they could refer
"situations" to the Court's attention. See also ICC STATUTE, supra note 1, arts. 13(a),
14.
61. See ILC DRAFT STATUTE art. 21, para. 1, reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 1, at 663. The ICC also would have been able to exercise jurisdiction without
State consent over matters referred by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of
the Charter of the United Nations. Id. art. 23, para. I. In the ICC Statute, preconditions
do not apply to Security Council referrals, although the complementarity restrictions on
admissibility do apply. See ICC STATUTE, supra note 1, arts. 12, para. 2, 17.
62. See Elizabeth Wilmshurst, Jurisdiction of the international Criminal Court, in
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 4, at 127-28.
63. See ILC DRAF STATUTE art. 21, reprinted in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 1, at 662.
64. Id. art. 22.
65. Id.
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acceptance of jurisdiction would be necessary. In addition to the
territorial, custodial, and requesting States, it was proposed that consent
also be obtained from the State of the victim's nationality and the State
of the suspect's nationality.66 Thus, as many as five States might possess
a veto over court proceedings.
On the other end of the range, Germany proposed that the ICC enjoy
inherent jurisdiction over crimes against humanity and war crimes as
well as over genocide - that is, "preconditions" to the ICC's exercise of
jurisdiction over the so-called "core crimes" would be deleted.67 This
proposal reasoned from the premise that these crimes are ones of
universal jurisdiction as to which all States have the power to prosecute.
Because each of the States that would be parties to the ICC Statute has
the power to prosecute individuals without regard to connections of
territory, nationality or the like, it was argued that the ICC should have
that power as well.68  Under this proposal, the ICC would have
jurisdiction over the relevant crimes, even if the perpetrators and victims
were nationals of States not party to the ICC Statute and even if the
conduct occurred on the territory of a State not party to the statute. The
German proposal eliminated the issue of acceptance of jurisdiction,
because acceptance by parties and non-parties alike would be rendered
moot. Non-parties, however, would not be obligated to cooperate with
the ICC.
69
There were also proposals that fell between these two. For example,
the United Kingdom proposed that a State automatically accepts the
ICC's jurisdiction by becoming a party to the ICC Statute and that the
ICC could only exercise jurisdiction when accepted by both the
custodial and the territorial States." Ad hoc consent would be required
66. See Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court (Draft Statute of the International Criminal Court and Draft
Final Act art. 7, option 2), in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 131
67. The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court: An Informal Discussion
Paper Submitted by Germany (1998), A/AC.249/1998/DP.2 at 3 [hereinafter German
Proposal]. "Only the German proposal gave the Court 'universal jurisdiction."'
Wilmshurst, supra note 62, at 132.
68. Id.
69. German Proposal, supra note 67, at 3.
70. The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court: An Informal Discussion
Paper Submitted by the United Kingdom (1998), A/AC.249/1998/WG.3/DP.1
[hereinafter United Kingdom Proposal]. The United Kingdom proposal would have
given the ICC "automatic jurisdiction." Wilmshurst, supra note 62, at 132, 132-33 n.18;
see Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court (Draft Statute of the International Criminal Court and Draft Final Act art.
if one of those States was a non-party."
By the last week of the Rome Conference, serious divisions on
jurisdictional issues remained." The German universal jurisdiction
proposal was no longer under consideration. A South Korean
compromise proposal enjoyed broad support, including from States that
previously supported universal jurisdiction. This proposal required the
ICC to obtain acceptance from any one of four States - the territorial
State, the custodial State, the State of the victim's nationality, or the
State of the suspect's nationality. The Korean proposal was more
protective of sovereignty than universal jurisdiction, because it required
acceptance of jurisdiction by a State with some connection to a given
case. But it was less protective than the UK proposal or the ILC draft
because such acceptance would be enough and it had a relatively broad
range of States whose acceptance would suffice.
Though support was broad, this proposal also engendered intense
opposition.73 The U.S., in particular, argued that the consent at least of
the territorial State and the State of the suspect's nationality must be1 4
required. Automatic jurisdiction also enjoyed broad support, but those
opposed felt strongly about the issue, holding on to the alternative of an
opt-in requirement for one or more categories of crimes or an "opt-out"
possibility.75
The issue was only resolved in the Conference's final hours through
the presentation of a "take it or leave it" package by the diplomats
coordinating the negotiations.76 The package, which was adopted as part
of the ICC Statute after the Conference voted to take no action on a U.S.
proposed amendment, 77 provides for automatic State acceptance of the
Court's jurisdiction upon ratification." But it allows States to opt-out of
accepting the ICC's jurisdiction over war crimes committed on their
territory or by their nationals for a "transitional" period of the first seven• 71
years in which they are parties. With regard to preconditions, the ICC
can only exercise its jurisdiction if either the territorial State or the State
of the suspect's nationality has accepted the ICC's jurisdiction. ° Non-
7, further option), in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 135.
71. Id. See United Kingdom Proposal, supra note 70.
72. See Wilmshurst, supra note 62, at 136.
73. See id. at 136-37.
74. See id. at 137.
75. See id. at 136. "Opt out" meant that ratification would result in automatic
acceptance of the ICC's jurisdiction, unless the ratifying State took the affirmative step
of declaring that it did not accept the ICC's jurisdiction.
76. See DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, at 3 1; Kirsch & Holmes, supra note 59, at 8-11.
77. See DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, at 31.
78. See ICC STATUTE, supra note 1, art. 12, para. 1.
79. See id. art. 124.
80. See id. art. 12, para. 2. These preconditions do not apply to cases resulting
[VOL. 2: 125, 2001] Review Essay
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.
parties can accept jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis."
Although the final ICC Statute is not as protective of state sovereignty
as the ILC Draft Statute, it remains firmly rooted in basic notions of
State sovereignty. First and foremost, there is the precondition that a
sovereign State with a strong interest in a particular case must accept the
jurisdiction of the ICC. Moreover, the two States whose acceptance can
satisfy this precondition are those whose sovereign jurisdiction over
such matters - the territorial state and the state of nationality of the
suspect - are most firmly established under international law." This
consideration - and the intense feelings of States opposed to less
stringent preconditions - motivated the last minute deletion from the
ICC Statute of the other two candidates in the Korean proposal: the
custodial State and the State of the victim's nationality.8' Likewise,
acceptance of jurisdiction remains a sovereign decision, which would
not have been the case if universal jurisdiction had been adopted, even
though automatic jurisdiction attaches greater consequences to the
sovereign decision to ratify the ICC Statute than would have an opt-in or
opt-out scheme.
The issue of State consent, as resolved by Article 12 of the ICC
Statute, has been at the heart of U.S. objections.' Throughout the debate
in Rome, the U.S. delegation insisted that preconditions at least include
acceptance by the State of the suspect's nationality. This concern
reflects the U.S. concern that the ICC not be used to pursue U.S. military
personnel or policymakers as long as the U.S. is not a party." Near the
end of the conference, the U.S. suggested a formulation that would keep
the ICC from acting where nationals of non-party States are engaged in
from a Security Council referral. See id.
81. Id. art. 12, para. 3.
82. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 402 cmt. a (1997) ("International law recognizes links of territoriality.. .and
nationality... as generally justifying the exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe."); STEPHEN
R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 140 (1997); see also Philippe
Kirsch, The Development of the Rome Statute, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
supra note 4, at 451, 460.
83. See Kirsch, supra note 82, at 460; see also Kirsch & Holmes, supra note 59, at
II n.34 (1999). The eleventh hour move prompted one human rights activist to complain
that the Bureau "took the Korean proposal, split it in half, and left us with North Korea."
Weschler, supra note 25, at 106 (quoting Richard Dicker of Human Rights Watch).
84. See Scheffer, supra note 50, at 17-20.
85. See id.
official action acknowledged as such by the State.86 In negotiations after
the Rome Conference to work out details of the ICC's functioning, the
U.S. continued to voice concerns about the exercise of jurisdiction over
non-party nationals.87
The basis for the U.S. position is plain: U.S. military personnel are
deployed worldwide both as a matter of routine and in response to
particular situations, and it is loath to see those personnel (and
policymakers directing their actions) subject to the jurisdiction of an
untested entity.88 Article 98 of the ICC Statute provides a mechanism for
protecting U.S. (or any other nation's) personnel from the ICC's custody
when they are in another State's territory with that State's consent
through the use of Status of Forces Agreements 9 and other treaties.90
For hostile or otherwise non-consensual deployments, theoretically, the
ICC could exercise jurisdiction. The prospect of an international court
trying an American sparks the most emotional response,9' even though
86. See id. at 20 n.17.
87. See Views and Comments by Governments, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT, supra note 4, at 573, 632-35 (summarizing views of U.S. delivered at a meeting
of the Sixth Committee of the U.N. General Assembly on Oct. 21, 1998).
88. See Scheffer, supra note 50, at 18. The ICC will not, however, present the first
instance of an international tribunal's having jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel.
After NATO's Kosovo air campaign in 1999, the Prosecutor of the ICTY conducted a
legal analysis of whether NATO forces committed war crimes. See Steven Lee Myers,
Kosovo Inquiry Confirms U.S. Fears of War Crimes Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2000, at
1. The ICTY's jurisdiction over NATO actions stems from the tribunal's statute, which
encompasses any conduct on the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. See
ICTY STATUTE, supra note 30, art. 1. Although the U.S. disputed the substantive basis
for any investigation, it did not dispute the Prosecutor's assertion of jurisdiction. See
Myers, supra, at 1. The committee appointed by the Prosecutor to review the NATO
bombing recommended that no investigation be opened. Final Report to the Prosecutor
by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, para. 91 (June 13, 2000).
89. A Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) governs the issues of jurisdiction over
military forces in a foreign country. Under SOFA that the United States negotiated with
its NATO allies in 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, 199 U.N.T.S. 67, U.S. military courts and host
country courts have concurrent jurisdiction over conduct by U.S. military personnel that
violates both U.S. military law and host country laws. The U.S. military courts have
primary rights to exercise jurisdiction for conduct in the performance of official duty;
otherwise, the host country courts have primary jurisdiction. See Robinson 0. Everett,
American Servicememebers and the ICC, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 7, at 137-39.
90. ICC STATUTE, supra note 1, art. 98, para. 2. "The Court may not proceed with
a request for surrender which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with
its obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending
State is required to surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first
obtain the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender."
Id.
91. See, e.g., Helms, supra note 3, at 9 ("We must take action to make clear that,
unless and until the United States ratifies the Rome Treaty, we reject any claim ofjurisdiction by the Court over American citizens. Period.").
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all Americans abroad are now subject to the jurisdiction of foreign
courts absent some explicit arrangement to the contrary, such as the
agreements referred to in Article 98.92
The political93 and legal94 merits of that concern are beyond the scope
of this essay. From the perspective of sovereignty, however, this
concern illustrates a basic paradox within a system of sovereign states.
A system of juridically equal sovereigns subject to no higher authority
creates conditions for violations of sovereignty due to inequality of
power.95 Thus, the U.S.' position is predicated not just on preserving its
own sovereignty, but also on preserving its ability to violate the
sovereignty of other States through intervention, including humanitarian
intervention.96 In this sense, the ICC Statute's jurisdictional provisions
actually reinforce the norm of State sovereignty by raising a perceived
barrier to actions that would violate that norm. 9' Indeed, that
consequence of the preconditions contained in Article 12 has been the
92. See Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 529 (1957) (per curium) ("A sovereign
nation has exclusive jurisdiction to punish offenses against its laws committed within its
borders, unless it expressly or impliedly consents to surrender its jurisdiction.").
93. See, e.g., Toward an International Criminal Court? (1999) (Council on
Foreign Relations) (arguments for and against U.S. participation in the ICC).
94. Compare Scheffer, supra note 50, at 17-19 (questioning the validity of Article
12 of the ICC Statute under international law), with Monroe Leigh, The United States
and the Statute of Rome, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 124 (2001) (arguing that "[m]ost
international lawyers have rejected" the U.S. legal argument); Bartram S. Brown, U.S.
Objections to the Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Brief Response, 31
N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 855, 868-78 (1999) (defending the legality of Article 12).
95. See, e.g., Donnelly, supra note 9, at 118 ("Even many characteristic violations
of sovereignty are themselves rooted in state sovereignty, that is, in the absence of
political power or legal authority above states."); KRASNER, supra note 8, at 20.
96. See Scheffer, supra note 50, at 19 (jurisdictional provisions of Article 12 will
present "significant new legal and political risks in such [humanitarian] interventions").
97. See id. at 19 ("The illogical consequence imposed by Article 12... will be to
limit severely those lawful, but highly controversial and inherently risky, interventions
that the advocates of human rights and world peace so desperately seek from the United
States and other military powers."). Until and unless the Statute is amended to define the
crime of aggression and establish conditions for the Court's exercise of jurisdiction with
respect to that crime, see ICC STATUTE, supra note 1, art. 5, the Court will not deal with
violations of sovereignty as such. ICC STATUTE art. 5, para. 2. The U.S. was deeply
concerned with the inclusion of the crime of aggression, without definition, in Article 5
of the ICC Statute. Id. See Scheffer, supra note 50, at 21 ("The future
definition.. .could be without limit and call into question any use of military force or
even economic sanctions."). An underlying dynamic of these and similar negotiations
that deserves more attention is that States' views of what most threatens their
"sovereignty" vary widely based on their relationship to the international system. Cf
KRASNER, supra note 8, at 21 ("Weaker states have always been the strongest supporters
of the rule of nonintervention.").
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basis for criticism of the ICC Statute by observers who are not
necessarily partisans of preserving State sovereignty per se.98
IV. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Perhaps no issue touched more directly on sovereignty concerns,
especially those of major powers, 99 than the treatment of information
claimed by a State to affect its national security. States obviously felt
compelled to maintain control over information in their possession, such
as intelligence, that affects national security. By the same token,
limitations on the ability of the ICC to obtain relevant information could
reduce its effectiveness and may hamper the pursuit of justice. In light
of the central importance of the issue both to States and to the
functioning of the proposed court, it is interesting that it was only
discussed in tangential fashion until relatively late in the processes
leading up to the Rome Conference.' °  Once the issue of national
security information was focused on, the two key questions were: 1) who
would have final authority to decide in the case of conflict between a
State and the ICC, and 2) on what standard would such decisions be
made.
In the complementarity context, giving the ICC decision-making
power, but setting a high standard that was protective of state
sovereignty ultimately answered those questions.'0 ' The United
Kingdom proposed a similar solution for national security information.
Under the United Kingdom proposal, the ICC would have had ultimate
power to order disclosure if cooperative measures failed to resolve a
State's claim of prejudice to national security as a ground for
withholding information. But disclosure could only be ordered if it was
"clear" that the State was "not acting in good faith towards the ICC"; if
the information was both "relevant to an issue before the ICC and...
98. See Fred Hiatt, The Trouble with the War-Crimes Court, WASH. POST, July 26,
1998, at C7 (arguing that deterrence of war criminals depends upon "the fear that the
world community-meaning, in most cases, the United States-will show the political will
and, when necessary, use the military force needed to stop them."); David Rieff, Court of
Dreams, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 7, 1998, at 16; see also Theodor Meron, The Court We
Want, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 1998, at A15 (arguing that ICC Statute art. 12 "effectively
lets off future Saddam Husseins or Pol Pots, who kill their own people on their own
territory.").
99. See Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 22, 39 (1999) ("The question of protection of national security
information was of particular concern to major powers.").
100. See Donald K. Piragoff, Protection of National Security Information, in
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 4, at 270, 274 (noting that before March
1998, "national security information was never directly and comprehensively discussed
as a separate item").
101. See supra Part II.
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necessary for the efficient and fair conduct of the proceedings"; and if
the ICC determined that the State's claim of prejudice to national
security was "manifestly without foundation."'0 2  In making its
determination of good faith under the first prong of this proposed test,
the ICC would look at factors such as: whether efforts had been made to
"secure the State's assistance through cooperative means... without
recourse to measures of compulsion," whether the State had "expressly
refused to cooperate" in resolving the dispute, or otherwise provided
"clear evidence that [it] does not intend to cooperate.' ' . 3
On its face, the standard proposed by the United Kingdom would have
empowered States. Relatively minimal efforts to cooperate would result
in respect even for assertions of national security that were "manifestly
without foundation." But the proposal compromised sovereignty to the
extent that it left the decision in the hands of the ICC. In this, the power
of the ICC would have been similar to that of the ICTY, which has held
that State claims of prejudice to national security do not remove the
obligation to comply with an order of the Tribunal to produceinformation."0
France proposed that a State assertion of serious prejudice to its
national interest would end the matter without further inquiry.' 5 The
unadorned bluntness of this proposal reflected what proponents of an
independent ICC believed would be the inevitable result of any scheme
that left the ultimate decision in the hands of States: Cooperation would
be totally at the discretion of States and the provision of standards or
procedures for cooperative resolution of disputes would be of little
practical significance."
102. Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, (Draft Statute of the International Criminal Court and Draft Final Act
art. 71, option 2) in DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 177-78; Piragoff, supra
note 100, at 275-76.
103. Report of the Preparatory Committee, supra note 102, at 178.
104. See Prosecutor v. Blaskic, IT-95-14, para. 15 (July 18, 1997) (Decision on the
Objections of the Republic of Croatia to the Issuance of the Subpoenae Duces Tecum.).
No doubt thinking that sauce for the goose should be sauce for the gander, Croatia
proposed at Rome that national security claims for withholding information be permitted
only if the Court determines the claims to be legitimate. See Piragoff, supra note 100, at
279 & n.199 (quoting Proposal submitted by Croatia, A/CONF.183/C.1IWGPMIL.32
(June 29, 1998)).
105. See Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, supra note 102, at 177; Piragoff, supra note 100, at 275.
106. See Justice in Balance, supra note 51, at 137; International Criminal Court,
supra note 51, at 88.
The U.S. also proposed that States have the ultimate decision whether
to provide national security information. 7 The U.S. proposal, similar to
that of the United Kingdom, provided guidelines for resolving disputes.
But it differed significantly from the United Kingdom proposal in that
the ICC's only recourse, if procedures failed to resolve the issue, would
be to refer the matter to the Assembly of States Parties or to the United
Nations Security Council. Moreover, referral was allowed only after the
ICC concluded that the information was "important to the resolution of a
critical issue in the case and that the State has manifestly acted in bad
faith" in refusing to provide the information."° The U.S. proposal thus
set a high standard and effectively left the ultimate decision in State
hands.
The fundamental gap evident between the United Kingdom and U.S.
proposals proved difficult to resolve and final agreement was not
obtained until the last week of the Conference.' °9  Under the ICC
Statute's final terms, the ICC cannot direct a State to hand over national
security information if cooperative dispute resolution mechanisms have
failed." °  Nor can the ICC direct an individual to provide national
security information in that individual's possession, if the individual
asserts a State's national security interest and the State confirms that
interest."' In cases in which requested information is not provided, the
ICC's recourse is to refer the matter to the Assembly of States Parties or,
where the United Nations Security Council originally referred the matter
to the ICC, to the Security Council."2 The ICC also "may make such
inference in the trial of the accused as to the existence or non-existence
of a fact, as may be appropriate in the circumstances.""' Elsewhere, the
ICC Statute provides that parties to the ICC Statute may refuse a request
for assistance from the ICC that "concerns the production of any
documents or disclosure of evidence which relates to its national
security."" 4 Only in very limited circumstances - primarily where the
information is in the hands of an individual or entity that does not owe
the State a duty of confidentiality and thus is beyond the State's de facto
107. See Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, supra note 102, at 178-79; Piragoff, supra note 100, at
276.
108. See Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, supra note 102, at 179.
109. See Piragoff, supra note 100, at 278-87.
110. See ICC STATUTE, supra note 1, art. 72, para. 7(a).
111. Seeid.
112. See id. art. 72, para. (a)(ii).
113. ICC STATUTE, supra note 1, art. 72, para. (a)(iii).
114. Id. art. 93, para. 4.
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control - can the ICC order disclosure."5 Consequently, the final result
is in line with the original U.S. proposal" 6 and thus protective - one
might even say fully protective"7 - of sovereignty concerns.
One source of the ultimate resolution of this issue was the realization
that, practically speaking, States in possession of information they
believe implicates their national security simply will not hand over that
information, ICC order or not."8 In other words, States cannot be
expected to act contrary to their perceived interest in an area as vital as
national security. Implicit in the Statute's resolution of this issue is the
recognition that a necessary coalition of States willing to support the
ICC in overcoming a State's assertion of national security as a general
matter would be unlikely to emerge. The recognition of these basic
realities in the ICC Statute's final treatment of national security
information underscores the extent to which the ICC will be operating in
a world of sovereign States.
V. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE
An institutional check on the ICC's power is that it will have to work
through States in conducting investigations, obtaining evidence, and
apprehending suspects. The extent to which States, by becoming parties
to the ICC Statute, take on obligations to assist the ICC in activities on
their own territory is very much an issue of sovereignty. As with other
areas defining the relationship between the ICC and States, the ICC
Statute's final text balances the willingness of States to make
commitments necessary for the ICC to function, with a recognition that
the ICC will operate in a world of sovereign States."9
115. See id. art. 72, para. 7(b)(i); see also Piragoff, supra note 100, at 292 (noting
that "there are few situations where paragraph 7(b) of Article 72 would be applicable");
id. at 292-93 (giving examples of situations in which Article 72.7(b) would be
applicable).
116. See Scheffer, supra note 50, at 16 (claiming that the U.S. view on protection of
national security information "prevailed"); ICC STATUTE, supra note 1, art. 93, para. 4.
117. See, e.g., Arsanjani, supra note 99, at 39 (noting that ICC Statute art. 72 gives
States "wide latitude in deciding on the disclosure of evidence in any form").
118. See Piragoff, supra note 100, at 281-82 (recounting Canadian intervention that
for information in the possession of a State, "the State always had the final word, de
facto, regardless of what the Statute might say about grounds of refusal").
119. See Phakiso Mochochoko, International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance,
in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 4, at 305 (describing the end result as "a
balance between the need for perfection on the one hand and States' concern for certain
crucial issues on the other").
The accommodation of sovereignty begins with the nature of the
general obligation that States undertake by becoming parties to the ICC
Statute. Proponents of a strong ICC favored a duty to "comply" with
orders, rather than an obligation of "cooperation," which was deemed to
be vague and weak. 2°  Article 86 of the ICC Statute, "[g]eneral
obligation to cooperate," reflects the latter formulation, requiring State
Parties to "cooperate fully with the Court."'' In an art form solution,
however, specific articles on surrender of suspects and other forms of
cooperation require States to "comply with requests" from the ICC.'2
Apart from whether the State obligation is cooperation or compliance,
a much more practical sovereignty issue is the extent to which that
obligation is effected through national legal systems and procedures. If
the main criterion were the ICC's independence, cooperation or
compliance would be determined solely with reference to the ICC
Statute, in particular, and international law in general.'23 Reliance on
national systems, on the other hand, is more in line with traditional
sovereign prerogatives.) The final text of the ICC Statute on the
surface appears to be a compromise.2 But it is a compromise that leans
heavily in favor of sovereignty concerns because it predicates the
Prosecutor's investigations on working with national authorities.
26
States are required to have national procedures for cooperation with the
Prosecutor and ICC,'27 and they have a duty to "consult" in the event of
difficulties in cooperation. 8 In the end, though, requests for cooperation
must be "executed in accordance with the relevant procedure under law
120. See id. at 306.
121. ICC STATUTE, supra note 1, art. 86.
122. Id. art. 89, para. I (Surrender of persons to the Court); art. 93, para. 1 (Other
forms of cooperation).
123. See Mochochoko, supra note 119, at 308.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 308-09 (explaining that opposition to reliance on national legal
procedures continued until "the necessary safeguards were introduced to ensure that even
procedural laws could not be used to weaken cooperation with the Court").
126. See, e.g., Testimony of David J. Scheffer, Hearing before the Senate
Subcommittee on International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Is a
U.N. International Criminal Court in the U.S. National Interest?, 105th Cong., 2d Sess.
27 (July 23, 1998) ("We worked very hard on these provisions, so that national judicial
procedures would have to be recognized by the prosecution in the pursuit of his work.");
Scheffer, supra note 50, at 15 (noting that efforts of U.S. negotiators "to preserve
appropriate sovereign decision making in connection with the obligations to cooperate
with the Court" ultimately led to the "requirement that the actions of state parties be
taken 'in accordance with national procedural law').
127. See ICC STATUTE, supra note 1, art. 88.
128. Id. art. 97; see also id. art. 91, para. 4 (providing for consultations pertaining to
request for surrender); id. art. 93, para. 3 (requiring consultations where a request for
cooperation is "prohibited ... on the basis of an existing fundamental legal principle of
general application").
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of the requested State.' 29
States can refuse to cooperate if doing so conflicts with "an existing
fundamental legal principle of general application."'3 ° The assertion of
such a principle appears to be in the discretion of the State, the only
limitation being that the State must consult with the ICC to resolve the
conflict.'3' But if consultations fail, it is the ICC that must concede, by
doing what is necessary to modify the request.'32 Furthermore, a State
may deny a request for cooperation outright if it calls for the production
of information "which relates to its national security."'33  Given the
nature of the ICC's subject matter jurisdiction, it is predictable that
almost any information sought by the ICC will be amenable to an
assertion that it "relates" to national security."'
As with national security information, the persistence of State
sovereignty as an organizing principle is evident from the ICC's
recourse in the event that a State fails to cooperate in violation of its
obligations under the ICC Statute. In that case, the ICC can find that the
State's noncompliance prevents the ICC from exercising its functions
and powers and then refer the matter to the Assembly of States Parties
or, in matters originally referred to the ICC by the UN Security Council,
to the Security Council.'35 The experience of the ICTY demonstrates
that the Security Council, even with its plenary authority over matters of
international peace and security, is not an effective mechanism for
enforcing the obligation to cooperate. Even less can be expected from
the Assembly of States Parties, which will consist of at least 60 states
and which must, wherever possible, make decisions consensually, or
failing that, by a two-thirds majority. 36
VI. CONCLUSION
Sovereignty concerns were central to the negotiations over the ICC
Statute. To be sure, the future court will relate to individuals and States,
129. Id. art. 99, para. 1; see also id. art. 89, para. 1 (States' surrender of persons to
the Court, "in accordance with ... the procedure under their national law"); id. art. 93,
para. 1 (ther forms of cooperation, "under procedures of national law").
130. Id. art. 93, para. 3.
131. See id.
132. Id.
133. Id. art. 93, para. 4 (emphasis added).
134. See supra Part IV.
135. See ICC STATUTE, supra note 1, art. 87, para. 7.
136. Id. art. 112, para. 7.
as well as inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations, in a
way that differs from the international institutions created at mid-
century.' But by designing an institution that must work through and
with sovereign States in crucial aspects of its functioning, the ICC
Statute presupposes the continued existence of a system based on
sovereign States. The Statute's details reinforce the notion that
"[d]irectly or indirectly, the entire edifice of international human-rights
law is built on state sovereignty."'' Seen in this light, there seems little
basis for predicting that the ICC will cause the sovereign State to fade
away. Moreover, the ICC may actually strengthen individual States by
acting both as a judicial model for effective domestic institutions, where
they do not now exist, and as a prod for states to deal domestically with
crimes within the court's subject matter jurisdiction. 39 To that extent, it
is consistent with a growing realization that weak states can be as much
of a threat to human rights as strong states.' 40
This does not mean, however, that the relationship between the future
ICC and sovereign States is one that will be accepted by the U.S.
political system through the process of advice and consent to ratification.
That judgment remains to be made.
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